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BEAL, SYLVAIN; GHINTRAN, AMANDINE; REMILA, ERIC; SOLAL, … - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 03, pp. 1340016-1

The river sharing problem deals with the fair distribution of welfare resulting from the optimal allocation of water among a set of riparian agents. Ambec and Sprumont [Sharing a river, J. Econ. Theor. 107, 453–462] address this problem by modeling it as a cooperative TU-game on the set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010682645

COALITIONAL BELIEFS IN COURNOT OLIGOPOLY TU GAMES

LEKEAS, PARASKEVAS V. - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 01, pp. 1350004-1

deviants we define a TU-game, the solution to which characterizes the set of coalitional beliefs that support core nonemptiness … TU-game and the j-belief core of it. We prove that the worth of S is minimized when the n – s agents split approximately … – s – (j – 1) members. Given the above, we prove that when goods are substitutes, the j-belief core is nonempty, provided …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662637

CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE KAR AND FOLK SOLUTIONS FOR MINIMUM COST SPANNING TREE PROBLEMS

TRUDEAU, CHRISTIAN - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 02, pp. 1340003-1

A review of the literature on cost sharing solutions for the minimum cost spanning tree problem is proposed, with a particular focus on the folk and Kar solutions. We compare the characterizations proposed, helped by some equivalencies between sets of properties.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883230

PREFACE

Petrosyan, Leon; Yeung, David - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 16 (2014) 02, pp. 1402001-1

No abstract received.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883231

INTRODUCTION

Fragnelli, Vito; Gambarelli, Gianfranco - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 02, pp. 1303001-1

No abstract received.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883232

THE DYNAMICS OF NORMS AND CONVENTIONS UNDER LOCAL INTERACTIONS AND IMITATION

ILLE, SEBASTIAN - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 16 (2014) 03, pp. 1450001-1

Restricting the analysis to general 2×2 coordination games, this article shows how under certain conditions, it is highly likely that individuals coordinate on a (pay-off) efficient through risk inferior convention. This contrasts with other equilibrium refinement criteria, such as risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883233

CONVEXITY OF THE "AIRPORT PROFIT GAME" AND k-CONVEXITY OF THE "BANKRUPTCY GAME"

HOU, DONGSHUANG; DRIESSEN, THEO - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 04, pp. 1340022-1

The topic is two-fold. First, we prove the convexity of Owen's Airport Profit Game (inclusive of revenues and costs). As an adjunct, we characterize the class of 1-convex Airport Profit Games by equivalent properties of the corresponding cost function. Second, we classify the class of 1-convex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883234

SOPHISTICATED ENFORCEMENT AND ADAPTIVE OFFENDERS

McCANNON, BRYAN C. - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 13 (2011) 02, pp. 235-246

The interaction between a sophisticated player and a fictitious player is analyzed and applied to the problem of optimal enforcement. An adaptive potential offender myopically responds to the history of past enforcement. How can a sophisticated enforcement official take advantage of this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883235

INTRODUCTION

Fragnelli, Vito; Gambarelli, Gianfranco - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 03, pp. 1303002-1

No abstract received.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883236

NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES FROM TU GAMES WITH INFORMATION COST

BRIATA, FEDERICA - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 13 (2011) 03, pp. 301-323

From a special class of TU games with information cost, given by the problem of sharing the costs of facilities among users, we build a noncooperative game in which every player asks for the assessment of whom the users are. We analyze two models, "naming" game and majority decision game: the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883237