Given a linear transformation L on a finite dimensional real inner product space V to itself and an element q ∈ V we consider the general linear complementarity problem LCP(L, K, q) on a proper cone K ⊆ V. We observe that the iterates generated by any closed algorithmic map will converge to...

This note provides a methodological contribution to the allocation of joint revenues obtained from passepartouts. In a passepartout system, a group of service providers offers a passepartout that allows its owners the use of specified services for an unlimited number of times during a fixed...

Bounded rationality questions backward induction without necessarily excluding such reasoning when anticipation is easy. In our stochastic (alternating offer) bargaining experiment, there is a certain first-period pie and a known finite deadline. What is uncertain (except for the final period)...

In this article, we revisit evolutionary stability in matrix games. We provide a new direct proof to characterize a pure evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), in games with exactly two pure strategies, as a strategy that is evolutionarily stable against multiple mutations. This direct proof...

In this paper, we present two real-world situations in which the standard hypotheses of a bargaining problem do not hold, and discuss how to tackle these situations.

This paper examines the existence of Berge equilibrium. Colman et al. provide a theorem on the existence of this type of equilibrium in the paper [Colman, A. M., Körner, T. W., Musy, O. and Tazdaït, T. [2011] Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria, J. Math. Psychol. 55,...

Meier [Games Econ. Behav. 62, 53–66] shows that the universal knowledge–belief space exists. However, besides the universality there is an other important property might be imposed on knowledge–belief spaces, inherited also from type spaces, the completeness. In this paper, we introduce...

A noncooperative game is said to be nonmonetized if the ranges of the utilities (payoffs) of the players are preordered sets. In this paper, we examine some nonmonetized noncooperative games in which both of the collection of strategies and the ranges of the utilities for the players are...

Mathematical foundations of conflict resolutions are deeply rooted in the theory of cooperative and non-cooperative games. While many elementary models of conflicts are formalized, one often raises the question whether game theory and its mathematically developed tools are applicable to actual...

This paper develops alternative models explaining why households with credit need to finance their projects (enterprises) avoid formal credit. More importantly it argues that the problem of avoidance of formal credit and ensuring credit access is not necessarily restricted to the small borrower...