This note deals with time-consistency and agreeability, two dynamic individual rationality concepts, in special linear-quadratic differential games. Conditions ensuring their satisfaction are derived and a link between sustainability of cooperation and fair sharing of cooperation surplus is...

A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production under Cournot competition is studied. The process is modeled as cooperative differential game. The stable distribution mechanism of the common cooperative benefit among players is proposed. We proved that the cooperative total stock...

The aim of the paper is to study some important differences between (classical) non-cooperative and (modern) cooperative supply chain management. For this purpose, the paper develops a differential game model involving operations and marketing activities that are performed by a manufacturer and...

This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the...

Today artificial neural networks are very useful to solve complex dynamic games of various types, i.e., to approximate optimal strategies with sufficient accuracy. Exemplarily four synthesis approaches for the solution of zero-sum, noncooperative dynamic games are outlined and discussed. Either...

This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters [2005] supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.

A review of the literature on cost sharing solutions for the minimum cost spanning tree problem is proposed, with a particular focus on the folk and Kar solutions. We compare the characterizations proposed, helped by some equivalencies between sets of properties.

No abstract received.

No abstract received.

Restricting the analysis to general 2×2 coordination games, this article shows how under certain conditions, it is highly likely that individuals coordinate on a (pay-off) efficient through risk inferior convention. This contrasts with other equilibrium refinement criteria, such as risk...