This paper studies how competition and vertical structure jointly determine generating capacities, retail prices, and welfare in the electricity industry. Analyzing a model in which demand is uncertain and retailers must commit to retail prices before they buy electricity in the wholesale...

Chapter 1 studies escalating fines for repeat offenders, that is, fine increases in the number of previous offenses. We demonstrate that a fine-setting authority does not in fact have an incentive to increase the fine for repeat offenders. However, if the authority has an interest in...

Dieses Lehrbuch vermittelt eine umfassende Einführung in die theoretischen und empirischen Grundlagen der Industrieökonomik. Einleitend werden die verschiedenen Elemente der Theorie der Firma diskutiert. Anschließend werden das Monopol und die grundlegenden Oligopolmodelle erläutert. Auf...

We provide a framework for analysing bilateral mergers when there is two-sided asymmetric information about firms’ types. We introduce the concepts of essentially monotone decreasing (EMD) and increasing (EMI) functions, which generalize the respective mono-tonicity properties. If the profit...

We investigate how various institutional settings affect a network provider’s incentives to invest in infrastructure quality. Under reasonable assumptions on demand, investment incentives turn out to be smaller under vertical separation than under vertical integration, though we also provide...