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We introduce a new kind of projection dynamics by employing a ray-projection both locally and globally. By global …. Using a correspondence between local and global ray-projection dynamics we prove that every interior evolutionarily stable … payoff structure. This yields an interesting class of so-called generalized projection dynamics which contains best …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765317
& Price [1973]. A TESS attracts nearby trajectories too, but the behavior of the dynamics nearby must be similar to the … behavior of the replicator dynamics near an ESS. Both notions are defned on the dynamics and immediately imply asymptotical … stability for the dynamics at hand, i.e., the equilibrium attracts all trajectories sufficiently nearby. We consider this the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008476351
This paper presents a complete survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection theories. We present all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124577
Through building the statistical structure of game theory, this paper develops a paradigm of rationality and equilibrium to model collective and interactive behaviors for various economic ecologies from a perfect organizing corporation to a complete freedom population such as an anarchy. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015892
Subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies (SSPE) is the most important solution concept used in applications of stochastic games, which makes it imperative to develop efficient numerical methods to compute an SSPE. For this purpose, this paper develops an interior-point path-following...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840979
We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894605
Harris, Reny, and Robson (Econometrica, 1995) add a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when nature's moves are atomless in the original game, SPE obtained via this channel can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012945084
dynamics observed in the ABS are analyzed and discussed. In contrast to a single structured population, the P strategy survives … only in one of the cases analyzed. The competitive dynamics and the evolutionary equilibrium of the game arranged in two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866518
games. These two games are driven by different dynamics when self-generated time series are considered. Both dynamics tend …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059395
Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of utility then market occupancies become inhomogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059416