The use of experimental settings to observe human behaviour in a controlled environment of incentives, rules and institutions, has been widely used by the behavioural sciences for some time now, particularly by psychology and economics. In most cases the subjects are college students recruited...

Coleman [1971. Control of collectives and the power of a collectivity to act. In: Lieberman, B. (Ed.), Social Choice. Gordon and Breach, New York, pp. 269ï¾–298] suggested two indices of voting power, power to prevent an action and power to initiate an action. This paper rigorously...

This paper incorporates the strategic interactions between tax payers and fiscal authorities to the standard theory of fiscal evasion. The existence and (local) unicity of Nash equilibrium are demonstrated by the players' best responses. Through a numerical analysis, it is concluded that...

We analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this article presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting...

Transport cost is second in importance after production cost in industry. It is the purpose of the present paper to study the impact of information sharing and contractual instruments between a supply chain and its transport suppliers. After reviewing the literature, we propose a model to...

The present paper analyzes a network formation problem, mainly based on the framework presented in Bala and Goyal (2000). We depart from their assumptions in two crucial aspects. On one hand, we assume that connecting to an agent pays of not only for the number of connections that the agent can...

This paper studies the evolution of effective pre-play communication in game where a single communication round precedes a simultaneous-move, complete-information game.

This paper proposes as a solution concept for games sets of Nash equilibria that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. We prove existence, examine some variants that are related to evolutionary solution concepts, and, most importantly, offer a unified approach to...

The paper describes three novel regularities in public choice games, tied to a Darwinian argument about rules that could be expected to govern social choice. Note: This is a revised version of this paper, originally titled "Two Tests For ‘NSNX’ Effects In Cooperation Experiments," and...