We study empirically and theoretically the growth of U.S. manufacturing exports from 1987 to 2007. We identify the change in iceberg costs with plant-level data on the intensity of exporting by exporters. Given this change in iceberg costs, we find that a GE model with heterogeneous...

The large, persistent fluctuations in international trade that can not be explained in standard models by changes in expenditures and relative prices are often attributed to trade wedges. We show that these trade wedges can reflect the decisions of importers to change their inventory holdings....

The large, persistent fluctuations in international trade that cannot be explained in standard models by changes in expenditures and relative prices are often attributed to trade wedges. We show that these trade wedges can reflect the decisions of importers to change their inventory holdings. We...

This paper studies export dynamics in emerging markets following large devaluations. We document two main features of exports that are puzzling for standard trade models. First, given the change in relative prices, exports tend to grow gradually following a devaluation. Second, high interest...

We consider lending and investment under asymmetric information in a small, developing economy. We allow different forms of financing contracts to arise endogenously in the credit market. Financial intermediaries mitigate a moral hazard problem in investment choice through costly monitoring and...

We consider lending and investment under asymmetric information in an emerging economy. We allow for different forms of financial contracts to arise endogenously in the credit market. We examine the impact of opening the capital account on both aggregate output level and the structure of lending...

Fixed transaction costs and delivery lags are important costs of international trade. These costs lead firms to import infrequently and hold substantially larger inventories of imported goods than domestic goods. Using multiple sources of data, we document these facts. We then show that a...

We consider lending and investment under asymmetric information in a small, developing economy. We allow different forms of financial contracts to arise endogenously. Financial intermediaries mitigate a moral hazard problem in investment choice through costly monitoring. We then examine the...