Should regulatory bank examinations be made public? Regulators have argued that the confidentiality of the examination process promotes frank exchanges between bankers and examiners and that public disclosure of examination results could have a chilling effect. I examine the tradeoffs in a world...

We examine the effects of changes in competitive conditions on the structure of loan contracts. In particular, we present conditions in which greater loan market competition reduces the stringency of contractual collateral requirements, a prediction that is consistent with anecdotal evidence...

We explore a firm's choice between public and private debt in a model where the firm's financing source affects its product market behavior. Debt can promote excessively risky product market strategies, but lender control through restrictive covenants - a characteristic of private debt - can...

This paper explores the optimal financial contract for a large investor with potential control over a firm's investment decisions. The authors show that an optimally designed menu of claims for a large investor will include features resembling a U.S. version of lender liability doctrine,...

We provide evidence on the costs and profitability of relationship lending by banks. We derive bank-specific measures of loan rate smoothing for small business borrowers in response to exogenous shocks to their credit risk and to interest rates, and then estimate cost and profit functions to...

We empirically examine whether access to deposits with inelastic rates (core deposits) permits a bank to make contractual agreements with borrowers that are infeasible if the bank must pay market rates for funds. Such access insulates a bank?s costs of funds from exogenous shocks, allowing it to...

Competition in retail and wholesale funding markets affect the incentive for originators (like investment bankers) and fund managers (like mutual funds) to form integrated intermediaries (banks). Independent firms integrate both to produce higher yielding, illiquid assets and to suppress...

We derive the optimal financial claim for a bank when the borrowing firm's uninformed stakeholders depend on the bank to establish whether the firm is distressed and whether concessions by stakeholders are necessary. The bank's financial claim is designed to ensure that it cannot collude with a...

We derive the optimal financial claim for a bank when the borrowing firm's uninformed stakeholders depend upon the bank to establish whether the firm is distressed and whether concessions by stakeholders are necessary. The bank's financial claim is designed to ensure that it cannot collude with...