We derive the optimal financial claim for a bank when the borrowing firm's uninformed stakeholders depend upon the bank to establish whether the firm is distressed and whether concessions by stakeholders are necessary. The bank's financial claim is designed to ensure that it cannot collude with...

We empirically examine the hypothesis that access to core deposits permits a bank to make contractual agreements with borrowers, which are infeasible if the bank must pay market rates for its funds. Access to core deposits insulates a bank's costs of funds from exogenous shocks. In turn, the...

We find that corporate loan contracts frequently concentrate control rights with a subset of lenders. Despite the rise in term loans without financial covenants--so-called covenant-lite loans--borrowing firms' revolving lines of credit almost always retain traditional financial covenants. This...

Are close, long-term relationships between borrowers and lenders feasible in an increasingly competitive financial marketplace? How do relationships that have developed between banks and firms change when firms gain access to alternative funding sources, especially public securities markets? Can...

Mitchell Berlin raises the question "Should Business Bankruptcy Be a One-Chapter Book?" The answer, in part, depends on the answers to other questions: What makes more economic sense? A bankruptcy system that auctions a firm's assets and distributes the proceeds among the creditors? Or one that...

Trade credit remains the single largest source of short-term business credit in the United States and other nations around the world. Why do production firms act as financial intermediaries - a role usually reserved for banks? In "Trade Credit: Why Do Production Firms Act as Financial...