Acquirers do not benefit from hiring the CEOs of firms they buy, either in terms of merger announcement returns or long-run operating performance. This is especially true when the retained CEOs exhibit inferior quality (as proxied by target firm industrial efficiency or the target CEO's...

Most extant studies consider golden parachutes as the totality of change-in-control payments. However, for the median CEO of firms listed in the S&P SmallCap 600 index in 2009, golden parachute payments are only 46% of total change-in-control compensation. We measure total change-in-control...

We examine how exogenous increases in foreign competition affect firms' earnings management behavior, using import tariff reductions as a natural experiment. Using a Difference-in-Differences framework, we find a significant increase in earnings management (and financial restatements) after...

This paper examines the incentive effects of a mandatory personal deductible in liability insurance contracts for directors and officers (D&Os). Exploiting a novel German law that mandates personal deductibles for executives, we document positive returns for affected firms around the first...

Using unique, hand-gathered data, this paper examines how public news about the target firmreleased publicly during the private merger negotiation process affects bidding strategies. Weprovide strong evidence that market reactions to information events during the private sale processhave a...