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Abschlußprüfung, Interessenkonflikt und Reputation : eine ökonomische Analyse
Kitschler, Roland - 2005 - 1. Aufl.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002607364
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Nash implementable liability rules for judgement-proof injurers
González, Patrick (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002472229
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Managerial opportunism during corporate litigation
Haslem, Bruce - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 60 (2005) 4, pp. 2013-2042
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003080666
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A note on negligence and collusion-proof liability
Garmon, Christopher - In: International review of law and economics 25 (2005) 2, pp. 256-263
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003137375
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On extended liability in a model of adverse selection
Balkenborg, Dieter - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002691462
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Strict liability in a principal-agent model
Newman, Harry A. - In: International review of law and economics 10 (1990) 3, pp. 219-231
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001100261
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Agent's liability versus principal's liability when attitudes toward risk differ
Privileggi, Fabio; Marchese, Carla; Cassone, Alberto - In: International review of law and economics 21 (2001) 2, pp. 181-195
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001595197
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Safety regulation and monitor liability
Feess, Eberhard; Hege, Ulrich - In: Review of economic design : RED 7 (2002) 2, pp. 173-185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001706869
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A model of central bank's accountability
Castellani, Francesca (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001691902
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Moral hazard in teams, anti-insurance, and a new theory of the firm
Kirstein, Roland (contributor); Cooter, Robert (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
mechanism, each team members is obliged to make a fixed, non-contingent payment, and chooses his individual effort. After the … output is produced, each team member receives a gross payment that equals the actual team output. We demonstrate that a Nash …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001745187