A paper presented at the February 2002 conference quot;Policies to Promote Affordable Housing,quot; cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and New York University's Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy

We show how price leadership bans, imposed as part of the European Commission's State aid control on all main mortgage providers except the largest bank, shifted the Dutch mortgage market from a competitive to a collusive price leadership equilibrium. In May 2009, mortgage rates in the...

We show how price leadership bans, imposed as part of the European Commission's State aid control on all main mortgage providers except the largest bank, shifted the Dutch mortgage market from a competitive to a collusive price leadership equilibrium. In May 2009, mortgage rates in the...

We show how price leadership bans, imposed as part of the European Commission's State aid control on all main mortgage providers except the largest bank, shifted the Dutch mortgage market from a competitive to a collusive price leadership equilibrium. In May 2009, mortgage rates in the...

This paper shows how price leadership bans imposed, as part of the European Commission's State aid control, on all main mortgage providers but the largest bank shifted the Dutch mortgage market from a competitive to a collusive price leadership equilibrium. In May 2009, mortgage rates in The...

We exploit a timely city-level panel of individual house price estimates for both small and big real-estate markets in California USA to estimate the impact of COVID-19 on the housing market. Descriptive analysis of spot house price estimates, including contemporaneous price uncertainty and...

We exploit a panel of Zillow Inc. property valuations to estimate the excess real-estate price growth attributable to speculation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic in three California regions. Our research design leverages the counterfactual comparison of price estimates for properties listed...

The most frequent mortgage loans in the US behave according to nominal interest rates with level loan payments (NRMs), like Fixed Rate Mortgages (FRMs) or Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs). We use a model to show that the tilt effect, an increase of real payments in the early years of the...

This paper presents evidence that reductions in mortgage interest rates associated with prepayment penalties are greater for riskier borrowers, as measured by mortgage type, credit scores, and local incomes and education levels. This is consistent with an efficiency view arguing that, by...

We use a model and show how inflation and mortgage loans based on nominal interest rates (NRMs), like FRMs, ARMs or IOs, are a source of instability for housing markets. NRMs allocate risk inappropriately and cause economic tensions due to the tilt effect (Lessard and Modigliani, 1975), the...