Showing 31 - 37 of 37
We study an under-utilized source of data on legislative effectiveness, and exploit its panel structure to uncover several interesting patterns. We find that effectiveness rises sharply with tenure, at least for the first few terms even after controlling for legislators institutional positions,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067094
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This paper provides a dynamic theory of the effects of organizational capacity on public policy. Consistent with prevailing accounts, a bureaucratic organization with higher capacity, i.e., a better ability to get things done, is more likely to deliver projects in a timely, predictable, or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014263619
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014316848
Turf wars commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013044424
Why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit? Many scholars focus on "wedge" issues such as religion or race, but another explanation might be geographically-based patronage or pork. We examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204332
We develop a rationale for roll call voting and position-taking in legislatures using a formal model of legislative vote buying and elections. In our model, citizens and an interest group are motivated by policy, while legislators are motivated by holding office. The group may attempt to buy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067943