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This paper identifies an error in Sundaresan and Wang (2015), hereafter SW, that invalidates its Theorem 1. The paper develops a model of contingent capital (CC) with a stock price trigger that is consistent with SW's framework and yields closed-form solutions for stock and CC prices. Yet the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012915973
We show that commercial mortgage borrowers behave opportunistically in order to obtain principal reductions. To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a model in which lenders cannot perfectly observe borrowers' use values and renegotiation is costly. We then study the effects of a 2009 IRS...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013403960
We derive an optimal compensation contract that incentivizes a credit rating agency (CRA) to exert effort and issue unbiased ratings. The contract rewards CRA when its credit rating is matched by the subsequent bond performance and penalizes it otherwise. The optimal contract can be implemented...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013308552
We study the effects of PPP loans on business competition. We start by introducing temporary cash subsidies into a model of monopolistic competition with differentiated products and heterogeneous production costs. We test the predictions of our model in a sample of U.S. airport hotels for which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014355217
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005046294
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We examine the relation between chief executive officers’ equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive debt contracts. These contracts require higher or lower interest payments when the borrower’s performance deteriorates or improves, thereby increasing expected costs of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009143570
We consider optimal incentive contracts when managers can, in addition to shirking or diverting funds, increase short term profits by putting the firm at risk of a low probability "disaster." To avoid such risk-taking, investors must cede additional rents to the manager. In a dynamic context,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183951
We consider optimal incentive contracts when managers can, in addition to shirking or diverting funds, increase short term profits by putting the firm at risk of a low probability "disaster." To avoid such risk-taking, investors must cede additional rents to the manager. In a dynamic context,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011080095
This article studies performance-sensitive debt (PSD), the class of debt obligations whose interest payments depend on some measure of the borrower's performance. We demonstrate that the existence of PSD obligations cannot be explained by the trade-off theory of capital structure, as PSD leads...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458900