This paper analyzes the recent mergers in the oil industry. Oil is assumed to be a homogeneous good which is produced by a small number of firms with different unit costs. Merger formation is endogenously explained as a result of cooperative decisions. We show that the mergers are amongst very...

This paper analyzes endogenous merger formation in oligopolistic markets where firms have different unit production costs. We reformulate the merger model, introduced by Barros (1998), by employing the core as cooperative equilibrium concept. We show that, depending on the size asymmetry in the...

This paper analyzes endogenous merger formation in oligopolistic markets where firms have different unit production costs. We reformulate the merger model, introduced by Barros (1998), by employing the core as cooperative equilibrium concept. We show that, depending on the size asymmetry in the...

Governments in extraction countries are anxious to estimate expected investment in development projects, since they represent an essential element of the macro economy. The overall level of activity is also crucial to oil companies, since the macro picture affects cost levels, the supplies...

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...

We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...

Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power...

I develop two related solution concepts, equilibrium coalitional behavior and credible equilibrium coalitional behavior, which capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options. The model does not...

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are...

This paper analyzes incentives for polluting firms to exchange abatement cost information under the non-linear pollution tax scheme ( differential tax') introduced by Kim and Chang [J. Regul. Econom. 5, 1993, 193-197]. It shows that polluting firms have - under mild conditions - an incentive to...