The issue of political integration between two countries (more generally two political constituencies) for economic reasons is studied within the context of a simple endogenous growth model with a productive public good financed by taxation. We consider two countries that initially differ in...

This paper studies the political support for social health insurance when a private alternative exists. Individuals differ only by their risk. For the more realistic distributions of risk, a majority of agents do not want public insurance. However, in a representative democracy, or in a direct...

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between inequality and the environment in a growing economy from a political-economy perspective. We consider an endogenous growth economy, where growth generates pollution and a deterioration of the environment. Public expenditures may either be...

We introduce a new way to model the Bismarckian social insuance system, stressing its corporatist dimension. Comparing the Beveridgean, Bismarckian and Liberal systems according to the majority voting rule, we show that for a given distribution of risks inside society, the Liberal system wins if...

In this paper we investigate the relationship between inequality and the environment in a growing economy from a political economy perspective. We consider an endogenous growth economy, where growth generates pollution and a deterioration of the environment. Public expenditures may either be...

In this paper we set up a political economy model of a two-country world economy, where an international agreement on the provisions of public goods generating cross-border externalities, such as environment protection, subject to feasibility, efficiency and equity constraints, has to be...