We apply stochastic stability to study the evolution of bidding behavior in private-values second-price, first-price and k-double auctions. The learning process has a strong component of inertia but with a small probability, the bids are modified in the direction of ex-post regrets. We identify...

We examine a model in which multiple buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infinite sequence of auctions. New buyers arrive on the market probabilistically, and are each endowed with a constant private value. Moreover, objects also arrive on the market at random times, so the number...

In a dynamic contest where it is costly to compete, a player who is behind must decide whether to surrender or to keep fighting in the face of bleak odds. We experimentally examine the game theoretic prediction of last stand behavior in a multi-battle contest with a winning prize and losing...

This paper introduces a class of contest models in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. We prove existence and uniqueness of a...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <A href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11238-010-9196-5">'Theory and Decision'</A>, 2011, 71(2), 269-295.<P> Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in...</p></a>

This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects that depend on the rank-order of her decision...

Often an auction designer has the option of selling, or purchasing, those lots available in one auction or a sequence of auctions. In addition, bidder opportunities will not be static, in part due to arrival of information, but also because bidders can face deadlines for making decisions. This...

We calculate equilibria of dynamic double-auction markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors are segmented into groups that differ with respect to characteristics determining information...

We consider a simplified model of finance market where two players carry on direct multistage bidding with risky assets (shares). One of the players (the insider) is informed on the liquidation price of a share, the other player knows its probability distribution only. It is shown that the...

This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player’s strategy generates direct or indirect affine “spillover” effects that depend on the rank-order of her...