A dynamic mechanism design problem is considered. We suppose dynamic population and identical perishable goods, such as time slots of a central facility and hotel rooms. We consider a situation where each agent needs to keep an object for more than one period to make profits. The seller makes...

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...

We model a spectrum auction where firms purchase units to participate in a constrained, multi-product, downstream market. We use dynamic programming techniques to numerically solve for the optimal bidding strategy in a clock auction. Firms value constraining competitor market power, so...

Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...

We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of a homogenous good, set reserve prices at their own independent second-price auctions. Each buyer has a private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit. Buyers can bid as often as they...

We study the dynamic mechanism design problem of a seller who repeatedly sells independent items to a buyer with private values. In this setting, the seller could potentially extract the entire buyer surplus by running efficient auctions and charging an upfront participation fee at the beginning...

The appearance of a Brownian term in the price dynamics on a stock market was interpreted in [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2003)] as a consequence of the informational asymmetries between agents. To take benefit of their private information without revealing it to fast, the informed agents have to...

We study collusion in repeated first-price auctions under the condition of minimal information release by the auctioneer. In each auction a bidder only learns whether or not he won the object. Bidders do not observe other bidders' bids, who participates or who wins in case they are not the...

We study efficiency properties of the irrevocable exit English auction in a setting with interdependent values. Maskin (1992) shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for efficiency of the English auction with two bidders. This paper extends both...

This article characterizes China's between-city skyscraper contest with an infinitely-repeated game. The mixed strategy equilibrium of this dynamic game-theoretic model implies that a Chinese city would be more inclined to build a taller skyscraper if the height of its current tallest building...