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less inclined to collude than men when collusion harms a third party. No gender difference can be found in the absence of a … distance is small they hardly behave collusively when collusion harms a third party. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938866
We analyze spying out a rival's price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962353
policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023495
constrained. We show that collusion sustainability is non-monotonic in the size of the capacity constrained firm, which has little …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013473721
define their objective functions. Our analysis focuses on the bearings of CSR on collusion over an infinite horizon … surplus has a pro-competitive effect under both full and partial collusion. Conversely, a higher impact of productivity on … pollution has an anti-competitive effect under partial collusion, while exerting no effect under full collusion. Under partial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737085
A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the firms cannot collude on their reports to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012876028
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320343
A competition authority has an objective, which specifies what output profile firms need to produce as a function of production costs. These costs change over time and are only known by the firms. The objective is implementable if inequilibrium, the firms cannot collude on their reports to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012602309
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419507