In the present note we construct an overlapping-generations (OLG) example in which free trade is Pareto-improving and the world equilibrium chaotic. The example is simple, but it is not incompatible with the general model of Kemp and Wolik

This paper introduces a new duality concept, factor income function, in order to establish the factor Price Equalization theorem and the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem in an oligopolistic Heckscher-Ohlin model with increasing returns to scale

The paper develops a model of international trade with increasing returns toscale by taking into account the possibility of cooperation among agents in an egalitarian economy. It is shown that each country gains from trade in a trading world in which there are arbitrary numbers of...

Based on some elementary results on duality, the paper proposes a much simpler way of deriving the class of non-homothetic CES production functions which was derived as a solution to a partial differential equation that defines the elasticity of substitution

The classical gains-from-trade conjecture was finally given a thorough Arrow-Debreu proof in 1972. Since then, the proposition has been repeatedly challenged. Some of the challenges rest on grounds which in no respect violate Arrow-Debreu assumptions. Those challenges are therefore without...

Much of the comparative statics of trade theory rests on the unrealistic assumption that in each trading country all households are alike or behave collectively as though they are alike. In the present paper the authors show that two well-known comparative statical propositions are highly...

The theory of involuntary international transfers (war indemnities) has been constructed on the assumption that the donor and recipient are completely indifferent to each other's well-being. The assumption is hard to justify since usually the transfers closely follow periods during which the...

PTAs are generally negotiated without any tariff concessions or transfers to non-member countries. Can such a PTA benefit the neighbors' welfare? In a two-good competitive equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepôt, a PTA without concessions to the outside will hurt the outsider's welfare...