This note investigates a set of dynamic versions of the level-k (LK) and cognitive hierarchy (CH) models in repeated normal-form games. Conventional LK and CH models assume a reasoning process that does not allow learning. This can be a restrictive assumption: When facing a repeated game,...

We test whether deviations from Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking contests can be explained by the slow convergence of payoff-based learning. We identify and eliminate two sources of noise that slow down learning. The first source of noise is present because each action is evaluated against a...

To classify cooperation types, a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a one-shot public goods game with strategy method are convenient experimental setups. We explore the within subject stability of cooperation preferences in these two games. Our results suggest that subjects classified as...

We test empirically the strategic counterpart of the Adaptive Decision Maker hypothesis (Payne et al., 1993), which states that decision makers adapt their attention and decision rules to time pressure in predictable ways. For twenty-nine normal form games, we test whether players adapt to...

Forward induction (FI) thinking is a theoretical concept in the Nash refinement literature which suggests that earlier moves by a player may communicate his future intentions to other players in the game. Whether and how much players use FI in the laboratory is still an open question. We...

We study mutual-aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the aggregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the (ex ante) efficiency of equal and...

The purpose of this study is to experimentally investigate an analytical model of tax compliance, assuming a game-theoretic situation between a taxpayer and a tax auditor. Specifically, we focus on the following three research questions. First, would the taxpayer's behavior change if the tax...

An often-replicated result in the experimental literature on social dilemmas is that a large share of subjects reveal conditionally cooperative preferences. Cooperation generated by this type of preferences is notoriously unstable, as individuals reduce their contributions to the public good in...

Standard theoretical prediction is that rational economic agents participating in rent-seeking contests should engage in socially inefficient behavior by exerting costly efforts. Experimental studies find that the actual efforts of participants are significantly higher than predicted and that...

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...