I propose a general power index in games. The power of an agent over an outcome is understood as the equilibrium effect on the outcome of variations in the agent’s preferences. I show that the new index, ∆, has the following properties: (i) classic measures of freedom of choice are a special...

In a market with indivisibilities, Roth and Postlewaite (1977) show that the (weak) core can suffer from instability problems, in the sense that groups of individuals might upset the equilibrium by recontracting among themselves. By contrast, the strong core is stable. Following the seminal...

Ultimatum games have been extensively used in experimental studies. By studying the consequences that restrictions shared by ultimatum games have in subject's behaviour, this paper argues that some results are falsified by design constraints. This paper also presents a taxonomy of certification,...

In uni-dimensional policy space, the median voter theorem provides a unique equilibrium characterization under simple majority rule. But for general decision procedures, the core is generically non-unique. We make a selection from the core by taking the limit equilibrium of a standard bargaining...

A lottery is often used to allocate public rental apartments in practice. The existing random assignments in the literature do not apply to public rental apartments because practical constraints are more restrictive. We provide a lottery-TTC algorithm to find a lottery allocation that has two...

This study proposes a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game model to analyse wage negotiations between one employer and two workers. Here, randomly selected workers choose whether to negotiate their wage contracts together or separately, considering wage contract externalities. We show...

This paper examines conditions for stability in bargaining networks. Network formation is endogenized and payoffs are determined according to the algorithm developed by Manea (AER, 2011). Unlike other papers in the literature, agents now internalize the entire network structure when choosing...

A new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining mechanism studied in Chatterjee et. al. (1993). This mechanism is used to analyze two classes of coalitional games with transferable utility. One class is that of strictly...

Asymmetric information can help achieve an efficient equilibrium in repeated coordination games. If there is a small probability that one player can play only one of a continuum of moves, that player can pretend to be of the constrained type and other players will coordinate with him. This hurts...

This paper studies Myerson's neutral bargaining solution for a class of Bayesian bargaining problems in which the solution is unique. For this class of examples, I consider a noncooperative mechanism-selection game. I find that all of the interim incentive efficient mechanisms can be supported...