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Petro rents, political institutions, and hidden wealth : evidence from offshore bank accounts
Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Johannesen, Niels; Dreyer … - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 15 (2017) 4, pp. 818-860
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011803984
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Petro rents, political institutions, and hidden wealth : evidence from bank deposits in tax havens
Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Johannesen, Niels; Dreyer … - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440371
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The political economy of institutions and corruption in American states
Alt, James E.; Dreyer Lassen, David - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014379040
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Strong Firms Lobby, Weak Firms Bribe: A survey-based analysis of the demand for influence and corruption
Bennedsen, Morten; Feldmann, Sven E.; Dreyer Lassen, David - 2009
We use survey responses by firms to examine the firm-level determinants and effects of political influence, their perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption/bribes are uncorrelated at the firm level; (b) firms that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321000
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Lobbying and bribes: A survey-based analysis of the demand for influence and corruption
Bennedsen, Morten; Feldmann, Sven E.; Dreyer Lassen, David - 2011
We use survey responses by firms to examine the firm-level determinants and effects of political influence, their perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption/bribes are uncorrelated at the firm level; (b) firms that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285541
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Lobbying and Bribes - A Survey-Based Analysis of the Demand for Influence and Corruption
Bennedsen, Morten; Feldmann, Sven E.; Lassen, David Dreyer - 2021
We use survey responses by firms to examine the firm-level determinants and effects of political influence, their perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption/bribes are uncorrelated at the firm level; (b) firms that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315996
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Strong Firms Lobby, Weak Firms Bribe : A Survey-Based Analysis of the Demand for Influence and Corruption
Bennedsen, Morten; Feldmann, Sven E.; Lassen, David Dreyer - 2009
We use survey responses by firms to examine the firm-level determinants and effects of political influence, their perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption/bribes are uncorrelated at the firm level; (b) firms that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014201186
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Strong Firms Lobby, Weak Firms Bribe: A survey-based analysis of the demand for influence and corruption
Bennedsen, Morten; Feldmann, Sven E.; Lassen, David Dreyer - Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), Økonomisk Institut - 2009
We use survey responses by firms to examine the firm-level determinants and effects of political influence, their perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption/bribes are uncorrelated at the firm level; (b) firms that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558673
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Lobbying and Bribes - A Survey-Based Analysis of the Demand for Influence and Corruption
Bennedsen, Morten; Feldmann, Sven; Lassen, David Dreyer - CESifo - 2011
We use survey responses by firms to examine the firm-level determinants and effects of political influence, their perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption/bribes are uncorrelated at the firm level; (b) firms that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144880
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Lobbying legislatures
Bennedsen, Morten; Feldmann, Sven E. - 2000
We analyze informational lobbying in the context of multi-member legislatures. We show that a single decision maker and a decentralized majoritarian legis- lature provide widely di .erent incentives for interest groups to acquire and transmit policy relevant information. The paper also shows a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142230