perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption …/or have fewer competitors have more political influence, perceive corruption to be less of a problem and pay bribes less often …

perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption …/or have fewer competitors have more political influence, perceive corruption to be less of a problem and pay bribes less often …

We examine the consequences of local laws modeled on the American Anti-Corruption Act (“AACA”), which aims to constrain …

over the period 2003-2014 using rich micro-data on corruption and firms. After anti-corruption audits, municipalities … administrative firm level datasets and face-to-face firm surveys, we argue that corruption mostly acts as a tax on the local economy …

I show that institutional investors can facilitate corporate lobbying. Firms with greater lobbying institutional … ownership lobby more. Using a novel dataset with lobbying information on specific congressional bills, I observe that …’ lobbying support. Bills lobbied by institutions are more likely to pass compared to bills only lobbied by firms. The passage of …

The primary approach to studying lobbying assumes that it allows interests to provide information to politicians … misalignment of preferences. This appears at odds with apparent empirical regularities showing that lobbying targets friends. Yet … this evidence has not convincingly identified politicians' pre-lobbying preferences. Avoiding this problem, I present a …

In this paper, I examine the role of firm lobbying in shaping the structure of US production networks, and its … to more regulations, and distant buyer-supplier connections. Further examination suggests that lobbying reduces … model of spatial production networks indicates that lobbying reduces misallocation by 22%, and explains 3.2% of the gain of …