We develop a partial equilibrium, perfectly competitive framework of a (potentially) vertically oriented industry. There are three types of firms: Upstream firms that use primary factors to produce an intermediate; downstream firms that use primary factors and intermediates to produce a final...

An essential facility produces 'access', an essential input used by a competitive downstream industry. The access charge is regulated. The essential facility can vertically integrate into the downstream segment and sabotage rivals increasing their costs.We systematically study the vertical...

We consider a vertically related market characterized by downstream imperfect competition and by the monopolistic provision of an essential facility-based input, whose price is set by a regulatory agency. Two possible industry patterns are examined: the regime of ownership separation, which...

To explain organizational decisions in multistage production processes we assume a production process with one producer and two suppliers of which one is the firm's direct supplier and the other one is the supplier of the supplier. The firm decides only on the organizational form of her direct...

Which firms find it optimal to integrate their input suppliers into the firm boundaries of control (vertical integration)? Which firms choose to expand their sourcing activities across the national border (offshoring)? This letter provides novel evidence on these questions based on a Spanish...

We explore the incentives of a vertically integrated incumbent firm to license the production technology of its core input to an external firm, transforming the licensee into its input supplier. We find that the incumbent opts for licensing even when licensing also transforms the licensee into...

This paper examines vertical integration incentives in the presence of a cost-reducing technology. Combining the technology adoption and vertical merger literatures in a simple duopoly model, I show that asymmetric integration can occur even in a purely symmetric set-up, without synergies or...

Vertical separation of generation from electricity retailing has often been required as a condition of electricity market liberalisation. A well-developed and liquid contracts market is similarly suggested as necessary to manage the resulting wholesale market risks, which risks are further...

Building on dynamic collusion theories, we predict that firms with less concentrated upstream or downstream industries have lower systematic risk because their supply chain partners tend to compete more aggressively during recessions, absorbing more of the adverse effect of aggregate shocks....