Many governance reform proposals are based on the view that boards have been too friendly to executives, for example, by awarding them excessive pay. Although boards are often on friendly terms with executives, it is less clear that they have systematically failed to function in the interests of...

CSR-Based Corporate Governance examines ways in which the concept of corporate governance has widened to incorporate stakeholder concerns as well as shareholder accountability. This study examines the association between environmental reporting practice and board size, board independence,...

Research question/issue: This study examines how ownership structure affects the presence of female directors on supervisory and management boards and the related advantages of gender diversity in the boardroom. It was conducted in a post-communist country and the argument is that the process of...

We examine the relation between organizational structure (public vs private) and managerial turnover in a large sample of U.S. offered mutual funds. Consistent with the hypothesis that publicly traded firms focus more on shorter term performance, we find that public sponsors are more sensitive...

This study presents an integrated investigation into the factors affecting executive ownership, the market value of the finn, and executive compensation by explicitly incorporating the simultaneity of the process determining these variables into the empirical estimation, Overall, the results of...

Chinese listed firms recruit independent directors in order to build up connections with people who can provide useful sources and/or protection rather than for their monitoring of top managements. It is found that Chinese listed firms particularly prefer two types of Guanxi provided by...

We find that the presence of independent directors who are blockholders (IDBs) in firms promotes better CEO contracting and monitoring, and higher firm valuation. Using a panel of about 11,500 firm-years with a unique, hand-collected dataset on IDB-identity and a novel instrument, we find that...

Grounded in agency theory, this paper investigates the effect of board independence on managerial ownership. We exploit the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated exchange listing requirements as an exogenous regulatory shock that raises board independence. Our...