We consider multi-player stopping games in continuous time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after all the players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy by observing other players' behaviors. Assuming the continuity of the payoff...

We set up a game-theoretic model to examine the oligopolistic price competition, considering two features of online search: the existence of a common search ordering and shoppers who have non-positive search cost. We find that in equilibrium firms set their prices probabilistically rather than...

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate...

We consider a model of directed search where the sellers are allowed to post general mechanisms. Regardless of the number of buyers and sellers, the sellers are able extract all the surplus of the buyers by introducing entry fees and making their price schedule positively sloped in the number of...

This article illustrates concurrent values emanating from mergers in the REIT industry. Prior studies on REIT mergers focused only single merger outcome(s); thereby, ignoring other existing concurrent values. Concurrent values are disentangled using game theory. Results illustrate embedded...

We propose an alternative notion of non-transferable utility (NTU) stability in matching models that relies on money burning. Our model captures an exchange economy with indivisible goods, fixed prices, and no centralized assignment mechanism. In these models, a non-transferable numeraire (e.g.,...

We consider a zero-sum optimal stopping game in which the value of the reward is revealed when the second player stops, instead of it being revealed after the first player's stopping time. Such problems appear in the context of financial mathematics when one sells and buys two different American...

We characterize equilibrium in a frictional environment where prices are not perfectly observed. Sellers send costly advertisements, which endogenously create buyers heterogeneity, to direct buyers' uncoordinated search, as in Butters (1977). The model helps understand advertising patterns in...

We consider a two-player non-zero-sum stopping game in which the payoff of each player is revealed when both players stop, instead of it being revealed after the first player's stopping time. Such problems appear in the context of economics and finance, e.g., when two company try to choose good...

After having met severe opposition with its introduction, evolutionary ethics is becoming increasingly popular. One adherent is Ken Binmore, who - extremely simplified - argues that evolution has equipped humans with the inclination to reciprocate, and that via reciprocity moral norms have...