This paper analyzes price elasticities in the Austrian market for mobile telecommunications services using data on firm specific tariffs. Both static and a dynamic panel data approaches lead to consistent results which provide evidence for a relatively elastic demand. Furthermore, some basic...

This paper examines the causes and effects of mobile number portability (MNP) and provides a survey of its implementation in Europe. We first examine the competitive effects and the costs of introducing MNP. Next, we discuss how to charge for MNP. We argue that a price cap regime starting from...

This paper analyses the interdependency between the market for music recordings and concert tickets, assuming that there are positive indirect network effects both from the record market to ticket sales for live performances and vice versa. Using a model with two interrelated Salop circles we...

Sollte das Engagement ausländischer Investoren, insbesondere Staatsfonds, in Deutschland kontrolliert werden? Roland Koch, Ministerpräsident des Landes Hessen, warnt vor möglichen staatlich gelenkten Investoren bzw. staatlich aufgelegten Fonds, die vermehrt strategisch agieren, um die...

Im vorliegenden Papier werden die Ursachen und das Ausmass von so genannten First-Mover Vorteilen (FMV) analysiert und wettbewerbsoekonomische sowie regulierungspolitische Implikationen eroertert. Im Zentrum der Analyse stehen dabei das theoretische Fundament von FMV, die empirischen Befunde zu...

This paper analyzes how competition works in mobile telecommuncations markets and, bases on this analysis, we discuss whether regulatory intervention in mobile telephone markets is justified from an economic perspective. Starting point of our analysis is the observation that an evaluation of...

This paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non-specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market. We apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to characterize the different equilibria. We...

This paper offers a cartel explanation for the stability of German collective bargaining institutions.We show that a dense net of legal safeguards has been yarned around the wage setting cartel. These measures make deviation by cartel insiders less attractive and simultaneously erect entry...