We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care … politicians' incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians' pay and with polarization of policy preferences …. Moreover, politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave …

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care … politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave … politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. …

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care … politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave … politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. …

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care … politicians? incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians? pay and with polarization of policy preferences …. Moreover, politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave …

Politicians differ in their ability to implement some policy. In an election, candidates make commitments regarding the …

In their pursuit of being elected, politicians might not provide their constituents with independent viewpoints, but …, "candor", can be sustained as equilibria. This means that the public's trust or distrust in politicians may be self …-fulfilling prophecies. Importantly, the more informed politicians are about public opinion, the more likely it is that populist behavior can …

limits on discretion are desirable when politicians do not share the electorate's policy preferences. Optimal political … optimal representation: the elected politician's platform is generally overly ambiguous. While our theory rationalizes a …

experimentation and, in line with theory, particularly so when they do not hold a strong opinion about the policy. In a subsequent … survey experiment among Dutch politicians, we find that politicians conform their expressed opinion about policy experiments … neither are politicians when we tell them that voters are not. …