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A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers : Supplementary Material

Diermeier, Daniel; Keane, Michael P.; Merlo, Antonio - 2004

This paper contains additional details about the model in our paper "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers" (Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2004)), as well as the computational methods we use to solve and estimate the model, and the construction of the data set

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069399

A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers, Second Version

Diermeier, Daniel; Keane, Michael P.; Merlo, Antonio - 2004

Theories in political economy depend critically on assumptions about motivations of politicians. Our analysis starts … from the premise that politicians, like other economic agents, are rational individuals who make career decisions by … wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns to a career in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069400

Don't blame me : a theory of politicians choosing policy advisors

Fishman, Arthur; Klunover, Doron - In: Journal of government and economics : JGE 10 (2023), pp. 1-7

We present a model in which an imperfectly informed politician chooses between appointing an independent expert, whose advice is revealed to voters, and a loyal expert whose advice can be concealed from voters and who can therefore be blamed for a bad outcome. The politician is privately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014414079

Do the Right Thing. A Comparison of Politicians' Incentives Across Constitutional Systems

Cella, Michela - 2015

Constitutional structures shape politicians' behaviour and hence policy outcomes through the di fferent incentive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013030603

Political Action Committee Donations to Incumbent Senators; a Corruption Motive

Flaxman, Brian - 2019

This paper utilizes six-year Senate terms and two-year reporting periods to analyze if Political Action Committees are using their donations to influence the actions of sitting Senators as opposed to simply trying to get those with favorable policy views re-elected. Senators that are early in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863070

The political economy of emission tax design in environmental policy

Glachant, Matthieu - 2002

In actual environmental policy, the design of actual pollution emission taxes differs significantly with the optimal Pigovian tax. In particular, earmarking prevails and actual taxes are usually combined with regulation. Furthermore tax rates are generally too low to significantly influence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011598001