We derive formulas for the performance of capital assets in continuous time from an efficient market hypothesis, with no stochastic assumptions and no assumptions about the beliefs or preferences of investors. Our efficient market hypothesis says that a speculator with limited means cannot beat...

Consider an American option that pays G(X^*_t) when exercised at time t, where G is a positive increasing function, X^*_t := \sup_{s\le t}X_s, and X_s is the price of the underlying security at time s. Assuming zero interest rates, we show that the seller of this option can hedge his position by...

We consider the game-theoretic scenario of testing the performance of Forecaster by Sceptic who gambles against the forecasts. Sceptic's current capital is interpreted as the amount of evidence he has found against Forecaster. Reporting the maximum of Sceptic's capital so far exaggerates the...

Statistical testing can be framed as a repetitive game between two players, Forecaster and Sceptic. In each round, Forecaster sets prices for various gambles, and Sceptic chooses which gambles to make. If Sceptic multiplies by a large factor the capital he puts at risk, he has evidence against...

Building on the game theoretic framework for probability, we show that it is possible, using randomization, to make sequential probability forecasts that will pass any given battery of statistical tests. This result, an easy consequence of von Neumann's minimax theorem, simplifies and...

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Part I Examples in Discrete Time -- Chapter 1 Borel's Law of Large Numbers -- 1.1 A Protocol for Testing Forecasts -- 1.2 A Game‐Theoretic Generalization of Borel's Theorem -- 1.3 Binary Outcomes -- 1.4 Slackenings...