We present a simplified model of the evolution of a society which is regulated by a formal unanimity voting procedure. We examine several protocols, which depend on whether admission or expulsion are permissible, and on the order with which they are implemented. Conditions which ensure the...

We study fundamental properties of monotone network enterprises which contain public vertices and have positive and negative costs on edges and vertices. Among the properties studied are the nonemptiness of the core, characterization of nonredundant core constraints, ease of computation of the...

The reactive bargaining set (Granot [1994]) is the set of outcomes for which no justified objection exists. Here, in a justified objection the objector first watches how the target tries to act (if he has such an option), and then reacts by making a profit and ruining the target's attempt to...

We study fundamental properties of monotone network enterprises which contain public vertices and have positive and negative costs on edges and vertices. Among the properties studied are the nonemptiness of the core, characterization of nonredundant core constraints, ease of computation of the...