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Encouraging a coalition formation

Maschler, Michael - In: Theory and Decision 56 (2004) 2_2, pp. 25-34

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005068020

An advantage of the bargaining set over the core

Maschler, Michael - In: Journal of Economic Theory 13 (1976) 2, pp. 184-192

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005160005

Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud

Aumann, Robert J.; Maschler, Michael - In: Journal of Economic Theory 36 (1985) 2, pp. 195-213

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005160078

Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution.

BARBERA, Salvador; MASCHLER, Michael; SHALEV, Jonathan - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for k periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043003