We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible. With an increase in the union’s bargaining...

We study eciency and distributional implications of bargaining in a monopoly, where the shareholders and the workers delegate the task of bargaining to a manager and a union leader respectively. Bargaining delegation leads to underproduction caus- ing the organizational pie to contract severely...

If managers bargain with workers over wage before choosing output in a Cournot duopoly, owners face two conflicting interests in designing managerial incentives: one for profit orientation to reduce wage, and the other for sales orientation to gain in output competition. The net effect depends...

We show under general demand and cost conditions that in a mixed duopoly with pollution the government will implement the socially optimal outputs and abatements by a tax-subsidy scheme and keeping the public firm fully public. The scheme requires taxing outputs and subsidizing abatements at...

It is observed in neuroscience, economics and psychology experiments that the presence of an image of a pair of eyes may result in higher level of altruistic behavior by subjects. It is hence concluded that the eye-image serves as a `social Êcue'. We test this against an alternative hypothesis...

We investigate whether a pure framing has any effect on the decisions made in a dictator game. We run a between subject dictator game with a giving and a taking frame whilst keeping the strategy space the same. Complying with the literature we find no overall difference in the amount allocated...