first investigate the extent to which collusive agreements are feasible. Secondly, we focus on collusion sustainability in … an infinitely repeated game. We show that, regardless of the degree of cost asymmetry, at least some collusion is always … sustainable. Finally, the degree of collusion is also endogeneised to show that cooperation has an upper bound determined by the …

In this paper we investigate the connection between cost asymmetries and the sustainability of collusion within the …, at least some collusion is always sustainable if firms are patient enough. We also endogenize the degree of collusion and …

We discuss the implications of a Stackelberg sequence of play between a cartel and the fringe. We consider two … different approaches to collusion: (i) one-stage static model and (ii) a multi-period oligopoly model. Our main result is that …

agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this …, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion. …

first investigate the extent to which collusive agreements are feasible. Secondly, we focus on collusion sustainability in … an infinitely repeated game. We show that, regardless of the degree of cost asymmetry, at least some collusion is always … sustainable. Finally, the degree of collusion is also endogeneised to show that cooperation has an upper bound determined by the …

lowering the prices they offer to customers. These mechanisms create much greater scope for collusion than economic models … unconcentrated the industry becomes. In some instances, lower market concentration makes collusion easier; smaller firms may be more … dependent on collaboration with rivals and thus may be easier to punish if they undercut collusion. These results run directly …

the link between overt collusion and price dispersion. Formal theories and observation of cartel behavior suggest that …

agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this …, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion. …

-period oligopoly model with homogeneous, quantity-setting firms, a subset of which are assumed to collude, while the remaining (fringe …) firms choose their output levels noncooperatively. We show that, in our model, collusion is easier to sustain the larger the … a firm is only willing to collude when otherwise collusion cannot be sustained. …

agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this …, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion. …