This paper considers a two-production-period model in which a state-owned firm competes against a labour-managed firm. In the first production period, the state-owned and labour-managed firms simultaneously and independently choose outputs. The chosen outputs become common knowledge and then, in...

The analysis in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) discusses the perfect equilibria of a continuous-time model of the strategic investment decisions of two profitmaximizing private firms in a new market and suggests that there are perfect equilibria where each firm does not invest to its steady-state...

This paper examines an international mixed model in which a domestic state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm competes against a foreign labor-managed income-per-worker-maximizing private firm. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to make a commitment to capacity....

This paper examines the effect of salvage market on strategic technology choice and capacity investment decision of two firms that compete on the amount of output they produce under demand uncertainty. A game theoretic model applies such that in the first stage firms choose their production...

This paper examines a two-period mixed market model in which a welfaremaximizing public firm and a profit-maximizing private firm can use inventory investment as a strategic device. It is then demonstrated that the equilibrium in the second period coincides with the Stackelberg solution where...

We consider internet service providers' incentives to zero-rate, i.e. do not count towards data allowances, the consumption of certain services, in the absence of payments from content providers. In a general model with various types of network effects, service substitutes or complements,...