A single unit of a good is to be sold by auction to one of many potential buyers. There are two equally likely states … independent and uniformly bounded below 1 and above 1=2, and nothing more. We demonstrate a modified second price auction that has …

I model the environment of Internet auction sites, such as eBay, as sequential ascending auctions. New buyers may enter … the auction site after some of the auctions have completed and only bid for the remaining auctions. I characterize a … bidding strategies are different. A lower-valuation buyer may win an auction while a higher-valuation buyer restrains from …

We study the optimal information disclosure policy in the optimal auction and the second-price auction when the seller … revelation could change the allocation of the good in both types of auctions. However, in the optimal auction, the change in … contrast, in the second-price auction, the change in allocation makes the revenue function non-convex, in which case the seller …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the … all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour …-bid auction in which the bidders’ payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism …

auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show …. We estimate the reserve price signaling model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. We find …

In light of recent developments in auction theory, this Article re-examines Delaware corporate law governing directors … directors resolves to sell a corporation, it must obtain the highest price reasonably available. Auction theory posits that, in … the rules of the auction. Delaware law, however, does not fully endorse directors' ability to make such precommitments …

auction’s desired incentive and efficiency properties without quasilinearity. While a fully efficient mechanism is impossible …, we show that any undominated outcome of the Vickrey auction has a negligible inefficiency when bidder wealth effects are … sufficiently small. In order to show this, we first place bounds on undominated bid behavior in the Vickrey auction when bidders …