We consider extensive-form games in which the information structure is not known and ask how much of that structure can be inferred from the distribution on action profiles generated by player strategies. One game is said to observationally imitate another when the distribution on action...

This paper presents the first formal examination of role of causal ambiguity as a barrier to imitation. Here, the aspiring imitator faces a knowledge (i.e., "capabilities-based") barrier to imitation that is both causal and ambiguous in a precise sense of both words. Imitation conforms to a...

We define value creation, competition, and value appropriation, and show that (i) there is a minimal level of value creation that is required if competition is to allow a firm to appropriate value; (ii) there is a higher level of value creation guaranteeing competition will result in value...

We explore the determinants of the payoffs an individual player may obtain in the equilibria of superadditive n-player coalitional games with transferable payoff. We provide conditions necessary and sufficient for the lower bound on a player's equilibrium payoff to coincide with his reservation...

The presumed connection between causal ambiguity and sustained, capabilities-based performance advantages is well-known to strategy researchers. This paper presents the first formal examination of this connection. I provide a precise distinction between the intrinsic, or potential, level of...