During the height of the Cold War, between 1965 and 1968, Robert Aumann, Michael Maschler, and Richard Stearns collaborated on research on the dynamics of arms control negotiations that has since become foundational to work on repeated games. These five seminal papers are collected here for the...

Schelling was an unusual economist and game theorist, although some demur. In some respects, he was a typical Cold War product, but in other ways he deviated strongly. His game theory seems to have served strategic interests well when we consider nuclear deterrence, but not so well, when we look...

Cooperative business firms are prevalent in agribusiness, yet no concise generalizedmodel exists to demonstrate how and why cooperative firms differ from, and may beselected over, the more common investor owned business firm. It is shown within ageneric transaction game that cooperatives fill...

"This paper reports the design and testing of a coordination process for finding a group agreement simultaneously about cost sharing and the nature of a shared good. The process was designed to search for a cost sharing equilibrium, a particular type of Pareto optimum. The cost share equilibrium...

Subsequently published as:"Incorporating Motivational Heterogeneity into Game Theoretic Models of Collective Action." Public Choice, 117, 2003, 295-315."Understanding cooperation in the context of social dilemma games is fundamental to understanding how alternative institutional arrangements may...

"In 1968, Hardin argued that all commonly-owned resources would tragically be depleted unless private ownership was granted. There are many case studies which prove Hardin wrong. Common-pool resources have been managed with success. However, this success does not imply (as some believe) that...