We study the efficiency of the negotiated transfer pricing mechanism proposed by Edlin and Reichelstein (1995) for solving a bilateral holdup problem in a multinational enterprise. Our main finding is that the proposed renegotiation procedure will generally not provide incentives for efficient...

We study the efficiency of negotiated transfer pricing for solving a bilateral hold-up problem in a multinational enterprise. We show that negotiated transfer pricing will generally not provide incentives for an efficient renegotiation of the initial contract and efficient investments because...

This paper analyses the optimal accounting and transfer pricing policies of two multinational duopolists facing price competition in the final product market. Our main finding is that firms in industries with a small number of competitors may benefit from using the same transfer price for tax...

Abstract: Für multinationale Unternehmen stellt das Transferpreissystem, zur Verrechnung von Leistungen zwischen Konzernteilen, ein zentrales Controllinginstrument dar, das sich im Spannungsfeld zwischen interner Steuerung und steuerlichen Auswirkungen befindet. Im vorliegenden Buch wird...

This paper analyzes a principal-agent-model with a principal, a manager, and a team of workers to investigate the incentive provision and optimal team size in a setting with uncertain productivity and team synergy effects which is typical for innovation environments. Workers are responsible for...