This paper analyzes the strategic use of bilateral supply contracts in sequential negotiations between one manufacturer and two differentiated retailers. Allowing for general contracts and retail bargaining power, I show that the first contracting parties have incentives to manipulate their...

We show that collective bargaining can enhance retailers’ buying power vis-àvis their suppliers. We consider a model of vertically related markets, in which an upstream leader faces a competitive fringe of less efficient suppliers and negotiates secretly with several firms that compete in a...

Avec les conflits successifs qui opposent producteurs et distributeurs, la grande distribution se trouve régulièrement placée au cœur des débats publics et accusée par les producteurs de facturer abusivement ses services. Deux évolutions importantes du secteur sont à retenir pour tenter...

Le secteur de la distribution française est l'un des plus réglementés d'Europe. La dernière réforme dite loi Dutreil II, qui succède à la loi Galland de 1996 a pris effet au 1er janvier 2006. L'un de ses principaux articles impose la réintégration d'une partie des marges arrière (la...

We analyse the impact of an entry threat at the downstream level on the ability of a pair of vertically integrated incumbents to collude. We present an original model of horizontal product differentiation on the final market and characterize the structures of this market for which an entry...

Considering a vertical structure with perfectly competitive upstream firms that deliver a homogenous good to a differentiated retail duopoly, we show that upstream fixed costs may help to monopolize the downstream market. We find that downstream prices increase in upstream firms'fixed costs when...

Considering a vertical structure with perfectly competitive upstream firms that deliver a homogenous good to a differentiated retail duopoly, we show that upstream fixed costs may help to monopolize the downstream market. We find that downstream prices increase in upstream firms' fixed costs...

Consumers increasingly prefer to bundle their purchases into a single shopping trip, inducing complementaries between initially independent or substitutable goods. Taking this one-stop shopping behavior into account, we show that slotting fees may emerge as a result of a rent-shifting mechanism...

[eng] Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers: determinants and consequences of the buying power - For many years now, relationships between retailers and manufacturers have always been tense and some of the strategies denounced as abusive. This raises doubts regarding the...