This paper analyzes central bank policies on monitoring banks in distress when liquidity provisions are conditional on performance and a bad shock occurs. A sequential game model is used to analyze two policies: one in which the central bank acts with discretion and the second in which the...

This paper asks if bonanzas (i.e. surges) in net capital flows are associated with a higher likelihood of banking crises and whether this association is necessarily through a lending boom mechanism. Using a new database covering over one hundred countries during 1973-2008, the paper shows that...

Given the indisputable cost of policy inaction in the run-up to banking crises as well as the negative side effects of unwarranted policy activation, policymakers would strongly benefit from earlywarning thresholds that more accurately predict crises and produce fewer false alarms. This paper...

This paper examines whether elections, which are generally held on fixed dates, and banking crises explain the timing of tax reforms and the allocation of the additional tax burden. Using an original fine-grained dataset of tax reforms, the paper finds support for the role of these two sources...

Political institutions can influence the likelihood of banking crises through both direct and indirect causal pathways. They may influence domestic economic conditions, thereby indirectly impacting the likelihood of a banking crisis, or they may directly affect the likelihood of banking crises...

Using a pan-European dataset of 8.5 million firms, we find that firms with high debt overhang invest relatively more than otherwise similar firms if they are operating in sectors facing good global growth opportunities. At the same time, the positive impact of a marginal increase in debt on...

I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and slow recovery from crises. When banks' investment decisions are not contractible, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a...

The Norwegian experiences of the past thirty years illustrate what we believe are two general tendencies in bank regulation. The first one is that a bank crisis will tend to focus regulators' minds and lead to stricter regulations. The second one is that cycles in regulation tend to interact...

We model banks' loan losses with a panel of European countries for the period 1982-2012 using three country-specific macro variables: output growth shocks, real interest rates, and a measure of excessive private sector indebtedness. We find that a drop in output has an intensified impact on...

The study examines the causes of financial crises in 31 emerging market countries during 1980 2001.It estimates a probit model using 23 macroeconomic and financial sector variables.Traditional variables such as unemployment and inflation, as well as several indicators of indebtedness such as...