The study of 1-convex/1-concave TU games possessing a nonempty core and for which the nucleolus is linear was initiated by Driessen and Tijs (Methods Oper. Res. 46:395–406, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1983</CitationRef>) and Driessen (OR Spectrum 7:19–26, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1985</CitationRef>). However, until recently appealing abstract and practical examples of...</citationref></citationref>

The survey presents recent results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games and their connections with differential and continuous-time games. The emphasis is made on the following(1)A general model allows to deal simultaneously with stochastic and informational aspects.(2)All...

We introduce the dual of a stochastic game with incomplete information on one side, and we deduce some properties of optimal strategies of the uninformed player.

The survey presents recent results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games and their connections with differential and continuous-time games. The emphasis is made on the following (1) A general model allows to deal simultaneously with stochastic and informational aspects. (2) All...