We examine rational learning among expert chess players and how they update their beliefs in repeated games with the …

prospects of a resource. We uncover the impact of exogenously shifting the prior beliefs of each player on the response …

prospects of a resource. We focus on Markov-perfect strate- gies under truthful revelation of beliefs. For reasonable initial … conditions, exogenously shif- ting the prior beliefs of one player towards more pressimism about the potential of natural … higher than before the pessimistic shift in beliefs of that single player. Due to this weakness in strategic conservation …

. Bayesian learning implies that beliefs about the likelihood of rare disasters drop to a much more pessimistic level once a … disaster has occurred. Such a shift in beliefs can trigger massive declines in price-dividend ratios. Pessimistic beliefs … between rational and adaptive Bayesian learning. Rational learners account for the possibility of future changes in beliefs in …

. Bayesian learning implies that beliefs about the likelihood of rare disasters drop to a much more pessimistic level once a … disaster has occurred. Such a shift in beliefs can trigger massive declines in price-dividend ratios. Pessimistic beliefs … between rational and adaptive Bayesian learning. Rational learners account for the possibility of future changes in beliefs in …

. Bayesian learning implies that beliefs about the likelihood of rare disasters drop to a much more pessimistic level once a … disaster has occurred. Such a shift in beliefs can trigger massive declines in price-dividend ratios. Pessimistic beliefs … between rational and adaptive Bayesian learning. Rational learners account for the possibility of future changes in beliefs in …

. Bayesian learning implies that beliefs about the likelihood of rare disasters drop to a much more pessimistic level once a … disaster has occurred. Such a shift in beliefs can trigger massive declines in price-dividend ratios. Pessimistic beliefs … between rational and adaptive Bayesian learning. Rational learners account for the possibility of future changes in beliefs in …

eventually approximate Nash equilibria of the repeated game under an absolute-continuity assumption on their prior beliefs.  We … revise beliefs that are performing badly.  We show that this process converges in probability to a Nash equilibrium of the …

We introduce coordination failures driven by beliefs regarding the presence of taste discriminators as a channel of … the theoretical predictions, beliefs about discrimination are a significant correlate of self-employment rates, as well as …