Price discrimination has raised numerous public concerns and many regulatory agencies have enacted fairness regulations on prices to curb such controversial practices. In this work, we find that, relative to non-regulation, appropriate regulation may alleviate the cut-throat price competition...

We analyze a duopolistic model of quality disclosure in which product differentiation can be either horizontal or vertical under two vertically differentiated product attributes. Disclosure is fully revealing in the absence of disclosure cost. When disclosure is costly, firms partially disclose,...

This paper derives the dynamic implications for price setting in an Edgeworth oligoppoly game with N2 competitors. The impetus to the dynamic game are "conjectured" variations in the prices set by competing firms whereby each firm expresses its belief that a decrease in its own price will be met...

This paper examines product return policies in an environment in which consumers differ by the return costs they experience themselves and impose on firms. We examine how firms use information about consumer return costs to customize product return payments, prices, and whether to permit returns...

A known policy dilemma occurs between the need to curb extra-large profits by some industries, like pharmaceuticals, and the need to ensure the incentive to produce is not damaged. This paper shows that a profit cap, imposed via taxation on a group of firms, can simultaneously eliminate...

This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. Our analysis contributes to the literature on delegated agency games with...

This paper deals with price competition among multiproduct firms. We consider a model with n firms and one representative buyer. Each firm produces a set of products that can be different or identical to the other firms' products. The buyer is characterized by her willingness to pay -in monetary...

We study the evolution of imitation behaviour in a differentiated market where firms are located equidistantly on a Salop circle. Firms choose price and quantity simultaneously, leaving open the possibility for non-market clearing outcomes. The strategy of the most successful firm is imitated....

This paper considers lifetime employment contracts asa strategic commitment and examines the respectiveequilibrium outcomes of the two cases of a quantity-setting duopoly game with substitute goods and a quantity-setting duopoly game with complementary goods. First, in the quantity-setting game...

We consider entry of additional firms into the market for a single commodity in which both sellers and buyers are permitted to interact strategically. We show that the market is quasi-competitive, in that the inclusion of an additional sellerlowers the price and increases the volume of trade, as...