We show, that Strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasiperfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of suppol ting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit. A...

This article summarizes the patterns of firm entry, growth, and exit in the four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries over the period 1963-1982. Entrants are disaggregated into new firms, existing firms that diversify into an industry by opening new production facilities, and existing firms that...

We construct a model in which a firm's reputation must be built gradually, is managed, and dissipates gradually unless appropriately maintained. Consumers purchase an experience good from a firm whose unobserved effort affects the probability distribution of consumer utilities. Consumers observe...

This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

The government issue of indexed bonds is often suggested as a response to inflation. While issuing such bonds may initially appear to enchance the government's ability to control the economy, recent studies have described a variety of indexing-induced distortions. In light of this, an assessment...

Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. The signals are independent and identically distributed across time but not necessarily agents. Does it follow that the agents will commonly learn its value, i.e., that the true value of...

Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. The signals are independent and identically distributed across time but not necessarily across agents. We show that that when each agent's signal space is finite, the agents will commonly...