This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the equilibriating process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash...

This paper characterizes modified evolutiona.rily stable strategies (MESSes) in Rubinstein's alternatingoffers, infinite- horizon bargaining game. The MESS concept modifies the idea of an neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple strategy over a more complex strategy when both yield the...

This paper studies a population of agents, each of whom can be either an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruists confer benefits on others at a cost to themselves. Altruism is thus a strictly dominated strategy and cannot survive if agents are rational best-responders. We assume that agents choose...

This paper examines an evolutionary model in which the primary source of noise that moves the model between equilibria is not arbitrarily improbvable mutations but mistakes in learning. We model strategy selection as a birth-death process, allowing us to and a simple, closed-form solution for...

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (messes) in Rubinstein's alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game. The mess concept modifies the idea of a neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple strategy over a more complex strategy when both yield the same...

Preferences exhibit relative consumption effects if a person's satisfaction with their own consumption appears to depend upon how much others are consuming. This paper examines a model of an evolutionary environment in which Nature optimally builds relative consumption effects into preferences...

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a...

In a population with a local interaction structure, where individuals interact with their neighbors and learning is by way of imitating a successful neighbor, cooperation is shown to be a stable strategy that cannot easily be eliminated from the population.