The enforcement of compliance with tax regulation is a complex task. This is particularly the case when the administrative capacity of the tax authority is low, as it often happens in developing and transition countries. This paper draws on some international experiences in fighting tax evasion...

We model the interaction between the informal credit market and the act of tax collection by the government; in presence and functioning of the informal credit market, the agents (the tax paying firms) engage in false or sham litigation and deferred tax payments. During the litigation period...

This paper shows why some countries are trapped in an equilibrium with high unofficial economic activity and corruption while other countries are not. The potential for different outcomes follows directly from the complementary nature of unofficial economy and corruption activity

Many federal and local governments rely on shaming penalties to achieve policy goals, but little is known about how shaming works. Such penalties may be ineffective, or even backfire by crowding out intrinsic motivation. In this paper, we study shaming in the context of the collection of tax...

Over the last 40 years, much attention has been paid to tax compliance, both theoretically and empirically. In treating this very broad field of research, the present survey focuses on enforcement policy

This note reviews May 2019 OECD framework agreement report, “OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Progress Report July 2018-May 2019” on international taxation of the ‘digital economy'. The core conclusions of the review are:1. The framework agreement proposals to-date represent complex,...

In contrast to financial arbitrage, which causes prices of economically equivalent transactions to converge in the direction of one price, regulatory arbitrage does not lead to such price convergence. In contrast, regulatory arbitrage tends to produce two different prices for economically...

We exploit exogenous variation in turnovers of China's municipal political leaders to study how political incentives affect firms' strategic tax avoidance behavior. We document robust cycles in corporate tax compliance corresponding with the timing of political turnovers. Specifically, we find...