bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …

bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …

bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …

Conditional cooperation is an important factor in voluntary cooperation. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that in public … good games conditional cooperation among rational players is feasible if cooperators are sufficiently inequality averse and … above minimum contribution level (symmetric cooperation). We generalize this result by showing, first, that there exist …

-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by … cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities. -- human … cooperation ; punishment ; culture ; experimental public good games …

enhance cooperation in finitely repeated environments. But, do people cooperate with randomly-matched peers by voluntarily … disclosure does help strengthen cooperation in a random-matching environment, such disclosure does not have effects if it …

bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …

approach to bargaining and cooperation and the parallel experimental studies of bargaining and negotiation. When arguing what …

laboratory experiment in which subjects lack any private material incentive to report partners’ actions, we find that most …