Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding … strategies seen in the lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses about why group size should matter when punishment is … rates no lower than small groups because punishment does not fall appreciably in large groups. However, hindrances to …

: that altruistic punishment can sustain cooperation. This paper extends their model in order to explain such recent findings …. It focuses on fear of punishment, not punishment itself, as the key mechanism to sustain contributions to the public good … differs, on average, in less than 5% compared to relevant experiments with punishment in the lab. …

This paper deals with the subject of third-party punishment. The paper compares, by means of an economic experiment …, punishment by a third party (Stand-Alone case) with punishment by third parties (In-Group environment). This deliberate … introduction of a second potential punisher is neither subtle nor marginal. Shifting punishment choices into this “enlarged …

We study the coevolution of cooperation, preferences and cooperative signals in an environment where individuals engage …

refugee populations can cooperate harmoniously. We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in Lebanon studying intra- and inter …-group behavior of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals in a repeated public good game without and with punishment. We find that …

refugee populations can cooperate harmoniously. We conduct a lab-in-thefield experiment in Lebanon studying intra- and inter …-group behavior of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals in a repeated public good game without and with punishment. We find that …

We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate … irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free … riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is …

We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate … irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free … riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is …